WE DON'T ALL SEE THE WORLD THROUGH THE SAME SAND COLORED GOGGELS
It’s been a little while since I last wrote so I figure I should give a little update. Lately things have been picking up. Which is not all bad as it displaces time better than sitting around, but otherwise is not anything to celebrate. I am not sure what has caused this recent upsurge in activity, but lately we have been pretty busy. Perhaps some new guys have come into the area, ones not afraid of the cold. Who knows?
Tragically during all this recent insurgent activity a soldier from this area was killed by an IED. I don’t really want to go into detail about that, but something that happened later that evening occurred that struck me and got me thinking. I have always known that everyone’s experience over here is different, but until that evening it wasn’t quite as clear just how different it can be. You see over here there is a term used, it is used to describe soldiers that don’t ever have to leave the FOB. This isn’t their fault, usually, but none the less those of us who do have to leave the safety of the FOB vent our animosity towards them by dubbing them FOBbits, or FOBgoblins. Again, I want to stress that it usually isn’t their fault that they never have to go outside the wire. So if you know someone who could be described as such, don’t think of their deployment as diminished… we are all still soldiers, and all still stuck in this country. That being said, there is often a naiveté about those who remain safely tucked behind the walls. It is from this, that the animosity springs; my animosity at least. Let me explain. As I have mentioned there has been a recent spike in insurgent activity, especially as it pertains to IED attacks. Some new TTP (Techniques, Tactics and Procedures) are emerging in the area and there is some evidence to suggest that there has possibly been an upsurge in insurgent numbers and/or improvements to their supply chain. To give you a little perspective without revealing too much, there have been more reportable IED strikes in the first 10 days of January than in all of December. So, with that in mind, I will regale you with what I overheard that enlightened me to the breadth of the disparity between my experience and that of one of my fellow soldiers, a FOBbit. I was sitting in the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) on the evening of the U.S. KIA. I had actually just learned that he had died from his wounds after being MEDEVAC’d to a military hospital. Having just learned this, needless to say I was a little shaken. This is the first U.S. KIA in this area since I have been here, and I had been to the scene of the incident and seen some of the carnage. While mulling all this over in my head, feeling for his loved ones, reconstructing his last moments in my head and generally not feeling to good about things; I heard a SGT on the phone next to me. He was speaking with someone who was coordinating a convoy through out AO the next day and was calling to see what the conditions were and if they should be aware of any recent activity in the area. The SGT sitting next to me was scanning a document that summarized all the recent insurgent activity in the area and after a few moments of reading declared to the soldier on the other end of the phone that there was nothing really going on in the area, nothing to significant anyhow. As soon as I heard what he said I had to stop what I was doing. I was stupefied. I was sitting there wondering how he could be reading that sheet and ascertain that there was no significant activity in the area. Perhaps the levels of activity were not worldwide news worthy but he wasn’t being asked about that. He was being asked about the condition of our roads and the level of danger that existed on them. I won’t reveal his position but it is part of his job to know and understand the patterns and significance of the insurgent activity in this AO. I briefly mused if the soldier who had died would agree with him or not; or if his family would think his death insignificant. I am being a little harsh here, but that is how I felt. I suppose that I also felt a little snubbed that all of the information that I spoon feed him and his colleagues hadn’t impressed on him. Being reserved as I am, I waited until he was off the phone before pulling him aside. I informed him of how differently he and I saw the situation and handed him proof of his err and told him he ought to call that person back and change his statements. The look on his face said it all. He really didn’t understand. This soldier had no real grasp on what was happening outside the gates. He replied, “Oh” before moving across the room and busying himself with mock paperwork until I left the room. Please don’t get me wrong. I am not accusing him of being callous or unsympathetic to the death of that soldier. For all I know he could have been friends with the guy. I am sure that he felt for him and that he too would deal with it in his own way. I just was amazed to discover that in his estimation that all the recent activity leading up to a U.S. KIA didn’t amount to anything “significant”. I don’t know if he heeded my advice or not. There was little I could do to force him to. After all perhaps it was I who had distorted the significance of the recent activity in the area. Perhaps I am too close to the action to understand how it all adds up on an administrative level. I don’t know. I guess I should just stick to my work and not bother with nosing into other peoples jobs. I guess that you just hope that all this is going to work. You take the information coming from the front lines and you consolidate it and learn from what the numbers tell you and then use that to inform your decisions. Right? I may be thinking above my pay grade here, but it seems pretty simple to me.
Anyhow, I just thought that was a prime example of how different two soldiers (one a FOBbit, one otherwise) in the same area, working in the same field, could view one event. There a many other observations along these lines, most of less import than this. Some are even funny. But this just sort of stuck in my “craw” and I wanted to vent a little. Plus it gave me an opportunity to use the word “craw” in my blog, and who can argue with that? So anyhow, looking back at what I’ve just written, I want to assure you all that there is no real need for alarm. Usually things do work better than the way that all went. Most of us over here actually do know what we are doing. And not to worry, those of us who do go out, usually don’t heed the advice of those who don’t anyhow… we have learned for ourselves how to best protect our own asses. Just for the record though, that convoy that came through the next day did get hit by an IED. No one was hurt, just a couple of blown tires, and we can thank God for that. Till next time.
Tragically during all this recent insurgent activity a soldier from this area was killed by an IED. I don’t really want to go into detail about that, but something that happened later that evening occurred that struck me and got me thinking. I have always known that everyone’s experience over here is different, but until that evening it wasn’t quite as clear just how different it can be. You see over here there is a term used, it is used to describe soldiers that don’t ever have to leave the FOB. This isn’t their fault, usually, but none the less those of us who do have to leave the safety of the FOB vent our animosity towards them by dubbing them FOBbits, or FOBgoblins. Again, I want to stress that it usually isn’t their fault that they never have to go outside the wire. So if you know someone who could be described as such, don’t think of their deployment as diminished… we are all still soldiers, and all still stuck in this country. That being said, there is often a naiveté about those who remain safely tucked behind the walls. It is from this, that the animosity springs; my animosity at least. Let me explain. As I have mentioned there has been a recent spike in insurgent activity, especially as it pertains to IED attacks. Some new TTP (Techniques, Tactics and Procedures) are emerging in the area and there is some evidence to suggest that there has possibly been an upsurge in insurgent numbers and/or improvements to their supply chain. To give you a little perspective without revealing too much, there have been more reportable IED strikes in the first 10 days of January than in all of December. So, with that in mind, I will regale you with what I overheard that enlightened me to the breadth of the disparity between my experience and that of one of my fellow soldiers, a FOBbit. I was sitting in the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) on the evening of the U.S. KIA. I had actually just learned that he had died from his wounds after being MEDEVAC’d to a military hospital. Having just learned this, needless to say I was a little shaken. This is the first U.S. KIA in this area since I have been here, and I had been to the scene of the incident and seen some of the carnage. While mulling all this over in my head, feeling for his loved ones, reconstructing his last moments in my head and generally not feeling to good about things; I heard a SGT on the phone next to me. He was speaking with someone who was coordinating a convoy through out AO the next day and was calling to see what the conditions were and if they should be aware of any recent activity in the area. The SGT sitting next to me was scanning a document that summarized all the recent insurgent activity in the area and after a few moments of reading declared to the soldier on the other end of the phone that there was nothing really going on in the area, nothing to significant anyhow. As soon as I heard what he said I had to stop what I was doing. I was stupefied. I was sitting there wondering how he could be reading that sheet and ascertain that there was no significant activity in the area. Perhaps the levels of activity were not worldwide news worthy but he wasn’t being asked about that. He was being asked about the condition of our roads and the level of danger that existed on them. I won’t reveal his position but it is part of his job to know and understand the patterns and significance of the insurgent activity in this AO. I briefly mused if the soldier who had died would agree with him or not; or if his family would think his death insignificant. I am being a little harsh here, but that is how I felt. I suppose that I also felt a little snubbed that all of the information that I spoon feed him and his colleagues hadn’t impressed on him. Being reserved as I am, I waited until he was off the phone before pulling him aside. I informed him of how differently he and I saw the situation and handed him proof of his err and told him he ought to call that person back and change his statements. The look on his face said it all. He really didn’t understand. This soldier had no real grasp on what was happening outside the gates. He replied, “Oh” before moving across the room and busying himself with mock paperwork until I left the room. Please don’t get me wrong. I am not accusing him of being callous or unsympathetic to the death of that soldier. For all I know he could have been friends with the guy. I am sure that he felt for him and that he too would deal with it in his own way. I just was amazed to discover that in his estimation that all the recent activity leading up to a U.S. KIA didn’t amount to anything “significant”. I don’t know if he heeded my advice or not. There was little I could do to force him to. After all perhaps it was I who had distorted the significance of the recent activity in the area. Perhaps I am too close to the action to understand how it all adds up on an administrative level. I don’t know. I guess I should just stick to my work and not bother with nosing into other peoples jobs. I guess that you just hope that all this is going to work. You take the information coming from the front lines and you consolidate it and learn from what the numbers tell you and then use that to inform your decisions. Right? I may be thinking above my pay grade here, but it seems pretty simple to me.
Anyhow, I just thought that was a prime example of how different two soldiers (one a FOBbit, one otherwise) in the same area, working in the same field, could view one event. There a many other observations along these lines, most of less import than this. Some are even funny. But this just sort of stuck in my “craw” and I wanted to vent a little. Plus it gave me an opportunity to use the word “craw” in my blog, and who can argue with that? So anyhow, looking back at what I’ve just written, I want to assure you all that there is no real need for alarm. Usually things do work better than the way that all went. Most of us over here actually do know what we are doing. And not to worry, those of us who do go out, usually don’t heed the advice of those who don’t anyhow… we have learned for ourselves how to best protect our own asses. Just for the record though, that convoy that came through the next day did get hit by an IED. No one was hurt, just a couple of blown tires, and we can thank God for that. Till next time.
posted by SSG.FEL at 10:28 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home